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Background: BRAC, a large Bangladeshi NGO, recently has been using female volunteer community health workers
(CHWs) in Dhaka urban slums to provide maternal and child health services. Due to erratic performance-based income
and higher opportunity cost the urban CHWs lose motivation which contributes to high dropout and poor
performance. This results challenges for the cost effectiveness and sustainability of the urban health program. CHWs
also consider their performance-based income very low compare to their work load. So, CHWs raise their voice for a
fixed income. In order to understand this problem we explored fixed income for CHWs and the correlates that
influence it. We surveyed a sample of 542 current CHWs. We used bidding game approach to derive the equilibrium
reservation wage for CHWs for providing full-time services. Then, we performed ordered logit models with bootstrap
simulation to identify the determinants of reservation wage.
Results: The average reservation wage of CHWs to continue their work as full-time CHWs rather than volunteer CHWs
was US$24.11 which was three times higher than their current performance-based average income of US$ 8.03. Those
CHWs received additional health training outside BRAC were 72% and those who joined with an expectation of income
were 62% more likely to ask for higher reservation wage. On the contrary, CHWs who were burdened with household
loan were 65% and CHWs who had alternative income generating scope were 47% less likely to ask for higher
reservation wage. Other important factors we identified were BRAC village organization membership, competition with
other health services providers, performance as a CHW, and current and past monthly CHW income.
Conclusions: The findings of this study are relevant to certain developing countries such as Bangladesh and Tanzania
which commonly use volunteer CHWs, and where poor retention and performance is a common issue due to erratic
and performance-based income. So, the study has implications in improving retention of health workers as well as their
level of performance. The study also suggests that the financial incentives provided to CHWs should be clearly based
on their qualifications and opportunity cost to ensure a high performing and motivated health workforce.
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Globally, the crisis of health human resources is a pressing
issue. It has been estimated that there is a shortage of at
least four million health workers worldwide [1,2]. The
typical scenario of health workforce in Bangladesh exacer-
bates poor provider-population ratios [3] as it does in many
other low-income countries. This is, indeed, a reflection
of global crisis which is considered as a major obstacle
to achieving the health-related millennium development
goals (MDGs) by 2015 [4,5]. Under these circumstan-
ces, community health workers (CHWs) provide a cru-
cial and strategic solution to the shortage of skilled health
workforce filling this gap in many developing countries
including Bangladesh.
In response to health workforce crisis, BRAC, a large
Bangladeshi NGO, has become a pioneer in the use of
female volunteer CHWs popularly known as Shasthya
Shebikas in its community based health programs since
1977. BRAC recruits and trains these CHWs who serve as
the first point of contact between community members
and BRAC health services [6]. Currently, 80,000 female
volunteer CHWs under BRAC Health Program are
serving as frontline workers at the community level.
BRAC CHWs are female, aged 25–40 years, married
and the youngest child must not be less than two years
of age. They have reading and writing skills. BRAC usually
recruits them from Village organizations (VO) members
in their own community. They are willing to work on a
voluntary basis and are acceptable to their community.
On joining each CHW receives a three-week basic
training on primary healthcare and the use of relevant
drugs and BRAC health commodities. They also receive
refresher training in each month.
BRAC CHWs usually provide essential healthcare
services including tuberculosis treatment in rural areas.
But BRAC has recently introduced these CHWs in
urban slums in a maternal, newborn and child health
project called Manoshi reaching over 6.2 million slum
population as it is being used as the key approach to im-
proving maternal and child health of the communities
in many developing countries [7]. In Manoshi each
CHW is responsible for overseeing an average of 200
households and visiting 8–10 of these per day. They visit
homes to disseminate health messages, identify preg-
nancies, bring pregnant women to delivery centres, ac-
company them during their delivery and provide
newborn care. For providing the above services in
the community CHWs earn a modest income although
they serve as volunteers [8]. But their income is
performance-based and is often erratic which is the
major reason of their high dropout [9] and poor per-
formance [10].
Recently, the experience of Manoshi program with
CHWs has highlighted two key issues: challenges ofretention of CHWs and the suboptimal performance of
those who remain in the program. The challenges of
retention have been explored in Alam et al. [9] and in
Alam & Oliveras [11], and performance elsewhere [10].
The impact of dropout of CHWs also has been explored
elsewhere [12]. During the field work of retention and
performance studies, many CHWs raised their voice
that they would prefer a fixed income rather than per-
formance-based erratic earnings. So, for understanding
the issues comprehensively, the Manoshi program also
extended its interest in exploring expected fixed income for
CHWs and the associated correlates. It is worth to note
that health workers significantly prefer a flat payment for
their services as opposed to competitive price as it is
evidenced in a discrete choice experiment in a community-
based health insurance scheme in Burkina Faso [13].
Financial income has been found to be the key factor
linked to CHW retention [9]. Past studies also have
found expectation of income from CHW role is a major
motivation behind joining this workforce [9,14,15]. It
should be mentioned that even though, these health
workers work on a voluntary basis, they earn some
financial incentives from selling essential health com-
modities and medicines and providing health services.
The provision of earning income from providing these
health services arise a legitimate question whether this
workforce can be labelled as volunteers since the defin-
ition of volunteerism always excludes the possibility of
financial gain from the services provided by a volunteer
[16]. Currently, performance-based financial incentives
that CHWs receive from their work are also very low
considering their work load. Due to low and erratic
nature of their income and higher opportunity cost of
their time they can’t consider CHW role as a permanent
occupation. The opportunity cost of working as a CHW
is even higher in urban areas than rural areas as urban
areas offer a range of opportunities with higher financial
income such as working for garment factories. The
unstable income from CHW work sometimes lessens
family support, especially from their husbands.
Due to lack of appropriate compensation, CHWs lose
their motivation, which significantly contributes to their
dropout and poor performance resulting challenges for
the cost effectiveness and sustainability of the program.
This suggests finding out a minimum amount of fixed
income that ensures proper accomplishment of CHW
job as well as exploring the effects of the associated fac-
tors on the fixed income level. Therefore, re-shaping of
the volunteer CHW model in terms of providing them
with a minimum fixed income higher than their reserva-
tion wage, a minimum wage at which a CHW would be
willing to discharge her duties properly [17], might be
an important way to addressing the problem of high
dropout rate and poor performance. Past studies provide
Alam et al. Health Economics Review 2014, 4:16 Page 3 of 10
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/16some indication regarding their expectation of a fixed
income and frustrations over erratic income but they do
not provide a rigorous assessment on their willingness
to accept a fixed reservation wage for accomplishing
their job and the associated correlates. This study aims
to explore the reservation wages of these CHWs along
with the factors affecting it applying an econometric
assessment. With a view to exploring the correlates of
reservation wage we perceived a set of hypotheses to test.
Those volunteer CHWs have joined with an expect-
ation of income are more likely to ask for higher reser-
vation wage; those who have more education and
training are more likely to ask for higher reservation
wage; and those who perform better and earn higher in-
come are more likely to ask for higher reservation
wage. On the contrary, those volunteer CHWs have
better asset holdings and/or alternative income generat-
ing scopes are less likely to ask for higher reservation
wage; and those who are burdened with household loan
are less likely to ask for higher reservation wage.
Finally, those CHWs are facing completion from other
providers in the community are less likely to ask for
higher reservation wage.
Methods
Sample
For a case–control study on retention during the first
two years of the project, a simple random sample of 542
current CHWs from the population of 1,125 current
CHWs listed in the Manoshi registers at the time of the
study was selected [9]. We simultaneously designed the
present study within the original case–control study on
retention. The controls from that case–control study,
542 current CHWs (that is, retained), formed the sample
for this present study.
For the case–control study on retention, the World
Health Organization’s Epi Info software (http://www.
who.int/chp/steps/resources/EpiInfo/en/) was used to
estimate the required sample size assuming an un-
matched case–control design. The study estimated the
proportion of controls who were exposed to factors of
interest (difficulty in educating children and fears and
misconceptions of family members about BRAC health
program) at 15%, based on an existing study of BRAC
urban CHWs [18]. In addition, the study assumed that
the odds ratio of dropout associated with exposure was
2 at the 95% confidence level and 80% power. For a ra-
tio of one case to four controls, the number of cases re-
quired was at least 133 dropout CHWs. The study
sampled both current CHWs and dropout CHWs using
project data and ended up with a total sample of 146
dropout CHWs and 542 current CHWs who participated
in the survey. The detailed sampling strategy was also
described elsewhere [9,10].Using a structured questionnaire we collected data from
542 current CHWs on socio-demographic characteristics,
household assets, current CHW activities, income, family
attitude, community approval, competition and so on after
having informed consent from each CHW. Finally, we
asked them whether a fixed income would encourage them
to discharge their CHW role properly. We found 94% of
them confirmed that they would be willing to discharge
CHW activities properly if they would have been provided
with a monthly fixed income. Thus our final sample con-
sisted of 510 current CHWs and we attempted to find
the reservation wage for them so that they would en-
sure their job well-done. The Institutional Review
Board of International Centre for Diarrheal Disease
Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B) approved this study.
Bidding game approach
People usually assume a bargaining stance when they
are asked about their reservation wage. Thus the wage
they report as their reservation wage is the one that
they normally start bargaining with and is above their
minimum acceptable wage [19]. One study addressed
this problem suggesting that the interviewer should “read
each salary or wage bracket starting from the lowest
and identify the first wage or salary bracket that the
respondent would be willing to accept” [20]. In our
study we applied bidding game technique [21] to deter-
mine their willingness to accept a fixed income assuming
that it would minimize the possibility of overstating the
reservation wage. Before stating bidding, we provided
them with the following precise description of terms and
conditions of the revised job offer of a CHW:
 A CHW would be paid a monthly fixed income for
her services at BRAC
 She would be required to perform all the duties she
is currently performing as a CHW and a list of
responsibilities would be provided
 Her total working hours and holidays would be
equal to that of a Shasthya Karmi (her immediate
senior worker who work as a full-time worker)
 She would not receive any extra financial incentives
beyond her fixed income for providing health
services or selling health commodities; however, she
would be still required to perform these services as
part of her CHW responsibilities
 Her work would be more closely monitored, and
 She would not have been paid if she would not
perform her assigned tasks
Thus we offered them a fixed income per month for
working as a CHW following the above conditions. When
they agreed with the mentioned income level, we lowered it
down and down until they disagreed with our offer. On the
Table 1 Number of times a variable significant in 1000
bootstrap simulation, Dhaka urban slums, 2008
Explanatory variables Frequency of significance
of coefficients (at 5% level)
Household loan 95.9%
Monthly past CHW income 93.3%
Monthly current CHW income 93.2%
Joined as a CHW with expectation of
income
92.2%
Competition with number of other
providers
76%
Alternative income generating scope 72.4%
Village organization membership 72.2%
Health training received outside BRAC 56.1%
Performance score 42.2%
Age 20.8%
Other income generating involvement 18.8%
Currently married 12.3%
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creased the amount until they agreed with the offered
amount. The maximum amount we offered them was Ban-
gladeshi Taka (BDT) 1800 (=US$ 26.66) per month as it was
the amount their immediate senior full-time worker,
Shasthya Karmi received per month at the time of data col-
lection of this study. If someone was not still happy with the
amount we offered, we asked them to mention their mini-
mum price for their CHW services. The minimum income
we offered them was BDT 100 (US$ 1.48) as it was reported
in a past study as the minimum monthly income of a volun-
teer CHW [14]. Thus from the bidding process, we reached
to an equilibrium amount of fixed income which reflects a
CHW’s reservation wage for duly furnishing her job. We
used four different starting amounts of fixed income, i.e.,
BDT 500 (US$ 7.41), BDT 600 (US$ 8.89), BDT 700 (US$
10.37) and BDT 800 (US$ 11.85) to reduce the problem of
starting point bias. In bidding games, the starting point
given to respondents can influence the final bid offered.
This can be caused by impatience of the respondent or can
happen because a starting point may suggest what size of a
bid is appropriate [22]. The study also took care of
strategic bias so that CHWs could not inflate their
reservation wage.
Econometric model
In this paper we estimated an explanatory model for the
fixed income of CHWs as full-time workers. We divided
the fixed income into three categories of ordinal nature
assuming these three categories attribute three levels of
performance: inactive, moderately active and active CHWs
respectively [10]. With these three categories the dependent
variable y (fixed income) can take values between 0 and 2.
The ordered logit model [23] is based on the following
specification:
y ¼
XK
k¼1
βkXk þ ε ¼ Z þ ε
where y* is the exact but unobserved dependent vari-
able which determines the values of the observed
variable y; x is the vector of independent variables, and
β is the vector of regression coefficients which we wish
to estimate and ε is disturbance term. Further suppose
that while we cannot observe y*, we, instead, can only
observe the categories of response variable y where it is
observed when the unobserved variable y* have crossed a
particular threshold μ. Here, if we have 2 thresholds, then
y ¼
0
1
2
if y ≤ μ1
if μ1 ≤ y
 ≤ μ2
if μ2 ≤ y

8<
:Then the ordered logit model uses the observations on
y, which are a form of censored data on y*, to fit the par-
ameter vector β. The μ’s were unknown parameters that
needed to be estimated with β’s. Then we could estimate
the probabilities of y taking different values using the
estimated parameters. Here, N = 2, the probability that y
took on a particular value were found as below:
P y ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 1
1þ exp Z−μ1ð Þ
P y ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ 1
1þ exp Z−μ2ð Þ
−
1
1þ exp Z−μ1ð Þ
P y ¼ 2ð Þ ¼ 1− 1
1þ exp Z−μ2ð Þ
Now, using the estimated value of Z and the assumed
logistic distribution of the disturbance term (ε), the ordered
logit model could be used to estimate the probability that
the unobserved latent variable y* falls within the various
threshold limits.
Analysis
Using an ordered logit model we investigated the factors
affecting the willingness to accept fixed income for prop-
erly rendering duties of a full-time CHW. The model
used equilibrium fixed reservation income level as the
dependent variable divided into three groups: inactive
group: BDT 200–1200 (US$ 2.96-US$ 17.77) per month,
moderately active group: BDT 1300–1900 (US$ 19.25-US$
28.14) per month and active group: BDT 2000 (US$ 29.62)
and above per month. We used different socioeconomic,
Table 3 Factors affecting willingness to accept fixed
monthly income of CHWs, Dhaka urban slums, 2008
Explanatory variables Coefficient† Robust
Std. error
Joined as a CHW with expectation of income 0.623** 0.189
Performance score 0.030* 0.016
Monthly current CHW income 0.001** 0.000
Monthly past CHW income 0.001** 0.000
Alternative income generating scope −0.475** 0.180
Household loan −0.652** 0.181
Competition with number of other providers −0.021** 0.008
Village organization membership 0.464** 0.191
Health training received outside BRAC 0.721* 0.366
/cut1 0.198 0.317
/cut2 1.387 0.323
**Significant at 1% level.
*Significant at 5% level.
†Coefficients (bias corrected observed bootstrap coefficients).
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variables to test our pre-conceived hypotheses.
Initially, to test our hypotheses we started with all
potential factors affecting willingness to accept fixed
monthly reservation income. We used simple ordered
logistic models to find significant factors. Then we
selected factors with p value ≤ 0.1 for inclusion in the
multiple logistic model. Finally, we selected our model
based upon drawing repeated (1000 times) bootstrap
samples [24] from the original dataset. In each bootstrap
sample, we ran multiple ordered logistic model to find
which variables were significant and how many times
(Table 1). We found that frequency of significance of
coefficients (at 5% level) for the variable of household
loan, monthly past income, monthly current income, and
‘joined with an expectation of income’ were more than
90%, whereas it was between 40%-80% for the variables
of ‘competition with number of providers’, ‘alternative
income generating scope’, VO membership, ‘health training
received outside BRAC’ and performance score (see
construction of performance score in Alam et al. [10]).
We found frequency of significance very low (12%-22%)
for the demographic characteristics of CHWs along
with a variable on whether they had any other income
generating involvement. Then we developed a preliminary
predictive model with the variables for those frequencies
of significance to be independent predictors of outcome
were high. We sequentially added other variables to this
preliminary model according to the proportion of boot-
strap samples in which we selected these variables as
significant predictors. Thus we proposed several models
with the predictive accuracy of models based on Akaike
information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information criterion
(BIC), pseudo R square and likelihood ratio test (Table 2).
We identified a final model (40%) based on a complicated
trade-off between smallest AIC, BIC and larger R square
value with the help of likelihood ratio test. We presented
results from the final model in Table 3.
Results
We presented socio-demographic characteristics of vol-
unteer CHWs in Table 4. The age of CHWs varied from
16 years to 60 years with a mean age of 32 years. Eighty-
six percent of CHWs were currently married althoughTable 2 Characteristics of the model, Dhaka urban slums, 200
Percentage Akaike information
criterion
Bayesian information
criterion
Pseudo
90% 1056.84 1082.25 0.0545
70% 1044.19 1082.30 0.0713
40% 1039.14 1085.72 0.0795
All 1041.41 1100.69 0.0829
*Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categobeing married was one of the criteria to be a volunteer
CHW at BRAC. Around 33% of CHWs had no formal
education. We observed a large variation in monthly
household income varied from BDT 500 (US$ 7.41) to
BDT 63200 (US$ 935.99) with a mean value of BDT
8857 (US$ 131.17).
The average reservation wage of CHWs was BDT
1628 (US$ 24.11). Around 37% of CHWs asked for fixed
income of BDT 200–1200 (US$ 2.96-US$ 17.77), 25%
for BDT 1300–1900 (US$ 19.25-US$ 28.14) and 37% for
BDT 2000 (US$ 29.62) and above (Figure 1).
The result suggests that CHW who started their work
with an expectation of income were 62% more likely
(significant at 1% level) to ask for higher reservation
wage compared to those who joined CHW work for
other reasons. CHWs who were performing their duties
at higher level were 3% more likely (significant at 5%
level) to ask for reservation wage compared to those
who were not performing at that level. We also found
that CHWs with monthly higher current income and
higher past income were more likely (significant at 1%
level) to expect higher reservation wage. On the con-
trary, CHWs who had alternative income generating
scope were 47% less likely (significant at 1% level) to ask8
R square Log likelihood LR test
p-value*
# of significant variables
−522.42 0.36 All of 4
−513.09 0.41 All of 7
−508.57 0.62 All of 9
−506.70 0.71 8 of 12
ries.
Table 4 Socio-demographic characteristics of CHWs, Dhaka urban slums, 2008
Characteristics Mean/% Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Age 32.24 9.10 16 60
Currently married 86.08% - 0 1
No education 33.73% - 0 1
Monthly household income of CHWs (US$) 131.17 99.20 7.41 935.99
Wealth score −0.06 1.00 −1.85 2.19
Village organization membership 35.49% - 0 1
Household loan 42.94% - 0 1
Length of CHW experience 14.19 3.73 3 22
Health training received outside BRAC 7.84% - 0 1
Joined as a CHW with expectation of income 60.98% - 0 1
Performance score 10.69 5.93 0 20
Monthly current CHW income (US$) 8.21 5.81 0.74 59.24
Positive family attitude 81.96% - 0 1
Community approval 9% - 0 1
Social prestige 15.95 0.89 −2.24 1.32
Competition with number of other providers 19.72 11.28 0 68
Other income generating involvement 37.84% - 0 1
Alternative income generating scope 45.49 - 0 1
Monthly past CHW income (US$) 13.40 21.48 0 222.15
*US$ 1 = 67.52 BDT (1st July 2008).
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burdened with household loan were 65% less likely (sig-
nificant at 1% level) to ask for higher reservation wage.
Similarly, CHWs who were facing competition with
other health services providers were 2% less likely0
50
100
150
200
CHWs
BDT 200-1200
(US$ 2.96-17.77)
Inactive CHWs
Bidding inco
BDT 13
(US$ 19.
Moderately a
Figure 1 Bidding income level of BRAC female volunteer CHWs, Dhak(significant at 1% level) to ask for higher reservation
wage. But CHWs with VO membership were 46% more
likely (significant at 1% level) to ask for higher reserva-
tion wage compared to those who were not VO mem-
bers. Finally, CHWs who received additional health>=BDT.2000
(>=US$ 29.62)
Active CHWs
me groups
00-1900
25-28.14)
ctive CHWs
a urban slums, 2008.
Table 5 Marginal Effects for the covariates in the final ordered logit model, Dhaka urban slums, 2008
Explanatory variables Outcome 0 (Inactive) Outcome 1 (Moderately active) Outcome 2 (Active)
Joined as a CHW with expectation of income −0.150* 0.004 0.146*
Performance score −0.007* 0.000 0.007*
Monthly current CHW income 0.000* 0.000 0.000*
Monthly past CHW income 0.000* 0.000 0.000*
Alternative income generating scope 0.109* 0.000 −0.109*
Household loan 0.153* −0.002 −0.151*
Competition with number of other providers 0.005 0.000 −0.005
Village organization member −0.104* −0.006 0.110*
Health training received outside BRAC −0.150* −0.031 0.181*
Xmfx_y 0.350 0.289 0.361
**Significant at 1% level.
*Significant at 5% level.
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at 5% level) to ask for higher reservation wage compared
to those who had no such additional health training
(Table 3).
Table 5 shows marginal effect of the explanatory var-
iables of our model. The results suggest that marginal
effect of almost all the explanatory variables in the
model had a lower magnitude for the reservation wage
of moderately active CHW group whereas it had
higher magnitude for the reservation wage of inactive
and active CHWs groups. It might imply that a larger
fraction of variations in wage level could be explained
by the explanatory variables in higher and lower level
of fixed reservation wage ranges. We found the effect
of outside health training the strongest in absolute0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Pr(Outcome==0) Pr(Outcome
Figure 2 Predicted values of three outcomes (inactive, moderately ac
slums, 2008.value and it increased the likelihood to be in the high-
est reservation wage group by 18.1% (significant at 5%
level) but decreased the likelihood to be in the lowest
reservation group by 15% (significant at 5% level). We
observed similar trends for the variable of ‘VO mem-
bership’ (11% vs.10.4%, significant at 5% level) and ‘joined
as a CHW with an expectation of income’ (14.6% vs.15%,
significant at 5% level). However, it also suggests that
household loan and alternative income generating
scope reduced the likelihood to be in the highest reser-
vation wage group by 15.1% and 10.9% (significant at
5% level) respectively. Figure 2 depicts the predictions of
the occurrence of outcomes with special attention to out-
come 1 (moderately active CHW group) which is more
likely the average choice of Manoshi CHWs.==1) Pr(Outcome==2)
tive and active BRAC female volunteer CHWs), Dhaka urban
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The result demonstrated that monthly average reservation
wage of CHWs to continue their work as full-time CHWs
rather than volunteer CHWs was three times higher than
the monthly average current income of US$ 8.03 reported
elsewhere [10]. One of the possible reasons that spurred
their expected level of income is that though they would be
in the same job their total working hours would be
increased. They would be required to serve as full-time
workers with only a day-off what their other field-based col-
leagues used to enjoy. The flexible working hours that they
are enjoying as volunteers would not be available any more
and this certainly would increase their opportunity cost to
be in the labour market. A number of studies suggests that
reservation wage for women largely depends on their family
duties that are assigned socially [25-27], and this finding is
relevant for the BRAC female volunteer CHWs. Besides,
their freedom would be furthermore impeded as their work
would be closely monitored by their supervisors. According
to stress-hypothesis, heavy workload combined with low
decision latitude gives cause for stress [28]. This might be
another reason of asking for a higher compensation by
BRAC CHWs under the proposed hypothetical conditions.
The study has captured both financial and non-financial
factors as important predictors of fixed reservation wage
of BRAC female volunteer CHWs. Despite the explicit
role of financial incentives in increasing retention and
performance of BRAC volunteer CHWs the assumption
of constant non-financial incentives is relevant to our
results in a sense that the association of BRAC always
offers volunteer CHWs a range of common non-financial
incentives irrespective of variations in performance-based
financial incentives over time. Our current analysis has
found financial incentives i.e., CHW’s joining BRAC with
an expectation of income, performance score (higher
performance is indicative of higher financial incentives
in a performance-based incentive system), and monthly
current and past CHW income as positive predictors of
fixed reservation wage. On the other hand, the study
found non-financial incentives i.e., alternative income
generating scope, burden of household loan, competition
with number of other providers, VO membership, and
additional health training received outside BRAC as
significant predictors of fixed reservation wage.
We found that CHWs who joined with an expectation
of income rather than serving the community were more
likely to ask for higher reservation wage. The possible
reason of asking for higher reservation wage might be
that CHWs would like to maximize their utility from the
financial incentives rather than other non-financial entice-
ment attributed to this offer. A recent study observed
similar findings that those CHWs joined BRAC with an
expectation of income were more likely to continue their
job compared to other CHWs [9].Factors that are indicative of the performance of CHWs
also determine the level of their reservation wage. One
of the direct indicators that we used in our model was
performance score of CHWs in which they had been
assessed on a composite score based on four core activ-
ities described elsewhere [10]. Besides, monthly income
of CHWs could be considered as an indirect indicator
of the performance of CHWs since such income largely
depends on their activities. Therefore, an active CHW was
more likely to have a higher level of monthly income.
The result suggests that CHWs who are performing
well would like to continue their work if they would
have been compensated with higher level of reservation
wage. Besides current income, we also found past income
of CHWs an important determinant of their reservation
wage. It also indicated that CHWs who had experience
of doing other work in the past or entered in the labour
market for a longer period of time would ask for higher
reservation wage. Other studies also have confirmed
that work experience has a positive association with the
level of reservation wage [19,29,30].
On the other hand, the likelihood of asking for higher
reservation wage decreased for the CHWs who had alterna-
tive income generating scope. One explanation might be
that these CHWs compromised financial income from
CHW activities with the social prestige and community
approval they used to enjoy because of the association with
BRAC, and they might use the ‘good name’ of BRAC for
earning from alternative sources. The other explanation
might be that the current flexible volunteer work arrange-
ments along with other income generating opportunities
might be a better-fit for BRAC volunteer CHWs than
the proposed restricted conditions on which the bidding
negotiation took place.
Besides, non-tangible assets such as education attain-
ment that increases the qualification of a person might be
important in determining the reservation wage. It was
found that person with a higher education is more likely
to ask for higher level of reservation wage [31]. In our
study, most of the CHWs were without any formal educa-
tion or with primary education only and we didn’t observe
any significant association between their education attain-
ment and reservation wage. However, in the current study
we found that CHWs with additional health training re-
ceived outside BRAC significantly asked for higher reser-
vation wage. In BRAC all CHWs receive same basic and
refresher training from BRAC but additional training
received outside BRAC makes a difference among
them. The additional training boosts up their confi-
dence level and makes them feel to be more positive re-
garding their aptitude for the CHW activities. It is also
reflected in the reservation wage that what they were
asking for was significantly higher for the CHWs with
additional health training received outside BRAC
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itional training other than the basic and refresher train-
ing from BRAC. Previously, additional health training
received outside BRAC was also found to be an import-
ant determinant for the performance of volunteer
CHWs [14].
We also found that VO membership of CHWs as micro-
finance borrowers from BRAC increased the likelihood of
asking for higher reservation wage. One of the possible
reasons might be that they were in better position in terms
of bargaining power since they were more closely attached
to BRAC compared to the CHWs who were not VO
members. Rahman & Tasneem [14] found that CHWs
who were VO members were more likely to perform
better and earn more compared to other non-VO mem-
ber CHWs. However, liability of the household nega-
tively affected the level of reservation wage of CHWs.
CHWs who were burdened with credit were ready to
accept job offer at a lower wage level. It is a common no-
tion that individuals with credit burden are in a vulnerable
situation and does not hold enough bargaining power to
negotiate on higher compensation. Similarly, we found
that the CHWs who faced competition from other health
services providers were less likely to ask for higher reser-
vation wage. It is our interpretation that competition from
other health services providers threatened their potential
income earning from CHW activities and put them in a
position with less bargaining power.
A number of studies found financial asset to be an
important determinant of reservation wage [19,29,32,33].
The wealthier people can afford to stay unemployed for
a longer period of time due to their better economic
status [34]. In our study we used asset holdings of the
CHW households to see whether it affected the level of
their reservation wage. But we didn’t find any significant
association between asset holdings and the reservation
wage. One of the possible reasons might be there was
very insignificant differences among the CHWs in terms
of their wealth status since all of them were slum
dwellers with similar kind of asset holdings.
The study has several limitations which one needs to
consider. Other non-financial factors such as positive
family attitude, community approval, positive community
appraisal, involvement with other NGOs, change in social
prestige and expectation of social recognition were found
to be important predictors of retention and performance
in past studies [9-11]. However, the current modelling
is not able to capture these non-financial factors. Add-
itional efforts along with more specific methodological
approaches need to be employed to capture the contri-
bution of these non-financial factors. Besides, there are
a number of other important factors as suggested by
past studies such as knowledge of the worker about the
current labour market, number of other employed personsin the household, job security, and family responsibility
that we could not consider for our model [19,20,35].
Moreover, understanding the determinants of the reser-
vation wage of the CHWs who had already dropped out
from BRAC would be interesting and could be explored
in future.
Conclusions
The results of the bidding game exercise have implications
both in improving retention of volunteer CHWs as well as
their level of performance. The findings of this study are
relevant to low-income countries, such as Bangladesh and
Tanzania, which frequently employ volunteer CHWs in
community based health programs, and high dropout
and poor level of performance of CHWs are common
problems there due to their erratic and performance-based
income. The underlying results of the current study could
positively influence retention and level of performance of
volunteer CHWs by promoting fixed reservation income
for them. So, the implementation of the findings of current
study could potentially address the shortage of trained
health workers as well as their poor level of performance in
these low-income countries by retaining trained CHWs
and motivating them for higher level of performance. This
could contribute to effective and viable community health
programs in low-income countries and thus could acceler-
ate the attainment of the health-related MDGs by the
stipulated time frame.
In the current study, factors influencing the fixed reser-
vation wage positively included additional health training
received outside BRAC, ‘joined as a CHW with an expect-
ation of income’, and BRAC VO membership. Negative
correlates were outstanding loan commitments of house-
hold and alternative income generating scope of CHWs.
The findings of this study clearly revealed that reservation
wage was significantly higher for the CHWs who were
well-performing and had better qualifications related to
the health service delivery. These are the CHWs who
need to be retained for increasing the effectiveness and
sustainability of the community based health programs
implemented by BRAC and others.
Currently BRAC CHWs receive a benefit lower than
the reservation wage, but have considerable flexibility in
their working conditions, and work is not rigorously mon-
itored. If working conditions become more demanding
and monitoring becomes stricter, it is important for the
program to provide an optimal system of incentives, and
these should generally be higher than the reservation
wage, to ensure a sustainable, high performing and moti-
vated community health workforce.
Therefore, the present study suggests that the financial
incentives provided to CHWs should be clearly based on
their qualifications and opportunity cost; otherwise, poor
retention and performance cannot be prevented. However,
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an optimum model of measuring and monitoring these
factors. This effort is considered to be well spent if it re-
sults in an effective incentive system for the volunteer
CHWs based on these criteria in future.
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